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Ireland’s economic boom from 1994 to 2000 (widely labeled the ‘Celtic Tiger’) has been 
seen by analysts as indicating the country’s success in benefiting from the opportunities 
offered by globalisation.1 While an initial reading emphasised that economic 
transformation had been achieved through market liberalisation,2 this was soon contested 
by a literature that focused more on the crucial role played by the state. Scholars at the 
influential Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) argued that ‘there was a great 
deal more to Ireland’s success than liberalization of markets. The state has been deeply 
implicated in the entire process, managing both economic development and the welfare 
state’3. They conclude that ‘it is not a simple story of globalization, forced withdrawal of 
the state and the promotion of neo-liberalism’4. Examining in more detail the role played 
by the Irish state, Ó Riain characterised it as a ‘flexible developmental state’ in contrast 
to the bureaucratic developmental states of East Asia, arguing that this constitutes a new 
model of state-led development that is more responsive to the demands and pressures of 
globalisation.5  
 
Kirby introduced the concept of competition state to the Irish literature, arguing that it 
describes more accurately the nature and operation of the Irish state in the era of the 
Celtic Tiger since it prioritises goals of economic competitiveness over those of social 
cohesion and welfare.6 Following Kirby, Dukelow also adopts the concept of competition 
state for the Irish case as ‘the state has taken a selective interventionist role in the manner 
of a competition state to re-orient social security policy to enhance economic 
competitiveness by tackling unemployment, yet leaving levels of income inequality and 
poverty remain relatively high’.7 Boyle baldly states: ‘Contemporary Ireland is an 
exemplar of the competition state, where social policy is subordinated to the needs of the 
economy’.8  
 
These debates on the role of the state in Ireland’s adaptation to globalisation echo and 
draw upon wider debates on how the state is changing under the impact of global market 
pressures.9 Yet, these debates have also been faulted for being conducted at too 
generalised and abstract a level, lacking a base in empirical study. Hay has written that 
‘the ethereal realms of abstraction at which the analysis is for the most part conducted are 
not densely populated with clearly identifiable actors, strategic or otherwise’.10 Phillips 
echoes and advances this critique, identifying economism (namely a concentration on 
state economic policy and strategies) and a functionalist bias (namely understanding the 
form of state as an outcome of its adaptation to the challenges of economic globalisation) 
as characterising these approaches. This bias, according to Phillips, results in a 
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‘generalized failure to consider or advance clear understandings of the processes by 
which outcomes are produced’ so that politics, in the sense of ‘variation, contingency and 
specificity in the institutional structures of states, the nature of state strategies and the 
types of state-society linkages that prevail in particular political economies’ is largely 
missing.11   
 
This article seeks to address these weaknesses through analysing the Irish state both 
theoretically and empirically. Taking as its starting point the debates on characterising the 
Irish state as either a form of developmental state or as a competition state,12 the article 
begins by defining the two terms as used in the Irish debate and discussing the differences 
between them. The following section elaborates a methodology through which to test 
what are essentially hypotheses about the Irish state, through an examination of the 
changing nature of social security policy. Section three undertakes the empirical 
examination of how and why policy in this area has changed while the fourth section 
draws out the implications of this empirical study both for the hypotheses on the nature of 
the Irish state. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
Developmental state or competition state? 
Understanding the institutional underpinnings of the Celtic Tiger, therefore, has given 
rise to two competing conceptions of the state. Is the contemporary Irish state a new type 
of developmental state, thereby holding lessons of successful development for many 
other states, or is it a competition state, an exemplar of how globalisation resituates the 
state so that it prioritises the needs of global capital over those of its own citizens? 
 
Developmental state 
Characterisations of the Irish state as developmental take as their starting point the 
literature that developed in the 1980s out of analyses of the role of the East Asian state in 
that region’s developmental success and which elaborated the concept of the 
‘developmental state’.13 In applying the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ taken from 
Evans14 to the Irish state, Ó Riain characterised the Irish state as a ‘flexible 
developmental state’ in contrast to the bureaucratic developmental states of East Asia, 
arguing that this constitutes a new model of state-led development that is more responsive 
to the demands and pressures of globalisation.15 His later work slightly amended the 
concept to that of a Developmental Network State (DNS) as ‘network centrality is critical 
to this new state – isolation from the local or the global renders it ineffective’.16 The 
concept of the developmental state was adopted by the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) in its 2003 tri-annual statement of the state’s economic and social 
strategy and used as the basis for proposing a Developmental Welfare State (DWS) for 
Ireland.17
  
Central to the concept of the developmental state is the concept of capacity. With 
Skocpol, we can define state capacity as the ability of the state to pursue and/or 
implement official goals.18 Much discussion of states presupposes such a capacity; 
however, as Weiss reminds us, ‘states are not uniformly capable across all policy areas’19 
and she quotes Krasner’s telling point that needs to be borne centrally in mind in any 
analysis of the capacity of today’s Irish state: 
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There is no reason to assume a priori that the pattern of strengths and weaknesses 
will be the same for all policies. One state may be unable to alter the structure of its 
medical system but be able to construct an efficient transportation network, while 
another can deal relatively easily with getting its citizens around but cannot get 
their illness cured.20
 
State capacity is therefore a more complex concept than is often acknowledged. Capacity 
(or its absence) may derive from organisational competencies within states (quality of the 
public service, organisational synergies and efficiencies, resources sufficient to achieve 
goals), from the social relations within which states are embedded (autonomy from vested 
interest groups is a major theme in the literature yet, in Evans’s view, it needs to be 
combined with an embeddedness in civil society so that the state serves social goals), or 
from the challenges posed by the external environment to the action of states (this theme 
looms large in the literature on globalisation). Synergies may be achieved between these 
different elements that account for final outcomes but, more often than not, capacity can 
be very unevenly spread across the complex institutional configurations that constitute 
states. Indeed, for Evans et al.: ‘The very unevenness of a State’s existing capacities … 
may be the most important structural feature to recognise in understanding how it 
confronts challenge’.21 Such a focus characterises Ó Riain’s work on the Irish state. His 
claim of developmental success rests on equating successful development with the 
generation of some successful industrial sectors. Acknowledging the pressures and 
opportunities of globalisation, Ó Riain labels his concept the developmental network state 
to take account of ‘the multiple embeddedness of state agencies in professional-led 
networks of innovation and in international capital, as well as by the state’s networked 
organizational structure’.22 However, he immediately acknowledges that ‘these multiple 
state-society alliances lead to uneven internationalization of society and growing 
inequality, generating political tensions with which the fragmented state structure cannot 
deal effectively’.23 Unevenness therefore is central to his concept of the Irish state.24
 
Yet, a reminder of the uneven nature of states’ capacity needs to be balanced by a 
recognition of the overarching capacity of states to achieve outcomes that are 
fundamentally transformative of the economy and of society. This finds expression in the 
literature on the developmental state and presupposes, if not unified action by states, at 
least the ability to follow a coherent project and to implement it with some success. It is 
this recognition that focuses attention on the need to identify the central logic of a state’s 
actions. For Weiss (as for most of the literature on the developmental state and for Ó 
Riain in the Irish case), the focus is on the state’s capabilities in the industrial economy: 
‘transformative capacity in this sense refers to the ability of a state to adapt to external 
shocks and pressures by generating ever-new means of governing the process of 
industrial change’.25 Yet, Weiss goes on to distinguish transformative capacity in the 
industrial sphere from distributive states or ‘dual’ states like Germany and Japan that 
‘combine both developmental and distributive capabilities – in short, growth with equity’. 
These latter, she adds, ‘may have more long-run potential’.26 This reading of state 
capacity therefore focuses not on policy tools, regime characteristics or class structure 
(which might account for the unevenness in capacity in different parts of a particular 
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state) but rather on the distinctive organisational complexes that characterise the varieties 
of capitalism literature27 as well as on the developmental projects that these states pursue. 
Beyond the unevenness therefore, a certain unifying logic is identified as characterising 
those most successful and sustainable states centred on a common transformative purpose 
to both economic and social policy.  
 
Competition state 
Whereas the developmental state concept emerged from analysing the ways in which 
certain developing states (in East Asia and in Latin America) succeeded in building a 
modern and competitive industrial economy, the competition state concept emerged from 
analysing the ways in which developed industrial states were restructuring themselves in 
response to the constraints and opportunities opened up by neoliberal globalisation in the 
1990s. While initially under pressure from internal causes such as recession and the fiscal 
pressures on welfare spending, by the 1980s and 1990s, welfare states were also under 
pressure from outside factors such as international competitiveness, the mobility of 
capital worldwide and intensified international trade28. A central cause of these pressures 
has been the impact of new information and communications technologies (ICTs). These  
have made possible both the more intense and immediate global interconnectedness that 
drives finance, production and trade and also new forms of corporate organisation that 
have come to dominate more and more key production chains worldwide, thereby 
strengthening the power of global market forces as against that of national state 
authorities. As Ruggie has recognised, the globalisation of financial markets and 
production chains challenged the premises on which the grand bargain between capital 
and labour rested since that bargain presupposed a world in which the state could 
effectively mediate external impacts through such tools as tariffs and exchange rates.29 In 
this situation, welfare states have not collapsed in the way that some communist and 
developing states did but they are under pressure to reduce costs and erode the level and 
extent of protection they previously provided.30 This global context, therefore, has 
created new pressures to which all states have to respond. It is out of analysing the ways 
in which states are responding that the concept of the competition state emerged. 
 
Various attempts have been made to characterise the new regime that is emerging as a 
successor to the Keynesian welfare state. Jessop sees this ‘new state form’ as a 
Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS) which seeks ‘to strengthen as far as possible the 
structural competitiveness of the national economy by intervening on the supply-side; and 
to subordinate social policy to the needs of labour market flexibility and/or to the 
constraints of international competition’31 In his work, Cerny describes the emergence of 
a ‘competition state’ out of the tensions between the demands of economic globalisation 
and the embedded state/society practices that characterised the national welfare state as 
the priorities of policy move away from the general maximisation of public welfare (full 
employment, redistributive transfer payments and social service provision) to the 
promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors. 
These reactions, however, follow no set pattern or master plan: ‘The emerging embedded 
neoliberal consensus is therefore not simply a developing “from outside” or “from 
above”; it is also a political construction promoted by political entrepreneurs who must 
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design projects, convince others, build coalitions and ultimately win some sort of political 
legitimacy “from inside” and “from below”.’32  
 
Tracing this process as they see it happening in western European states and the 
European Union itself, in North America and New Zealand, in Latin America and in 
eastern European countries, Cerny et al. identify a process that is ‘almost without 
exception elite-driven …. based on sustained support from converted academics, policy 
advisers and consultants both within and outside the public sector, government officials, 
and firms and other economic actors, especially representatives of employers and 
business organisations, and, especially consumers and many taxpayers’.33 What can be 
observed, therefore, ‘is not so much the continuity or maintenance of older “varieties of 
capitalism”, but rather the emergence of varieties of neoliberalism – of diversity within 
convergence, of the forging of different “roads to globalisation”. … States are 
increasingly becoming “competition states”’.34 This belies any easy claim that the state is 
retreating or that its role is marginalised in the political economy of today’s globalised 
world order. Rather, what is happening is the redefinition of its core activities as it adapts 
to the new global environment in which it operates. This helps make sense of what 
otherwise may seem a contradiction between the state’s ever weakening ability to secure 
the welfare of its citizens while on the other hand it becomes ever more intrusive in the 
life of the national economy such as, for example, through a myriad of new regulatory 
agencies. As they point out: ‘Deregulation was never really deregulation; it increasingly 
became the replacement of outcome-orientated and discretionary interventionism with 
new market friendly regulations – a form of pro-market re-regulation. Indeed, in many 
cases the new regulations were more complex and onerous than the old type. A well 
known example is that of insider trading regulation in financial markets, almost unknown 
(except in the US) before the 1980s’.35  
 
These two conceptions of the state therefore have some common features but differ in a 
number of crucial ways. Perhaps most significantly, both agree that the state can make a 
difference though, perhaps echoing their different origins, the competition state concept 
recognises more fully the constraints placed on state actions by the competitive pressures 
of today’s globalisation. Both acknowledge the uneven nature of state actions, though 
both also claim that a central overarching logic can be identified behind this unevenness. 
It is the nature of this overarching logic that constitutes the key difference as 
developmental state theorists claim that such states possess the capacity to achieve 
outcomes that fundamentally transform the economy and society towards higher levels of 
development. Competition state theorists, on the other hand, identify a logic that moves 
state actions away from the maximisation of welfare towards the promotion of enterprise 
and profitability as national elites respond to the pressures of globalisation. Theorists of 
both concepts recognise that both developmental and competition states do not confirm to 
uniform models but reflect the internal political configurations and culture through which 
the overarching logic of developmentalism or competition is mediated, though it must be 
said that both literatures have paid insufficient attention to the politics through which 
these logics emerge and come to dominance.  
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Where there is less clarity about the differences between both concepts concerns the 
possibilities for more progressive forms of both types of state. Cerny et al. recognise that 
neoliberal public policies ‘do not merely constrain but also bring opportunities. 
Contemporary politics entails both a process of choosing between different versions of 
neoliberalism and the attempt to innovate creatively within the new neoliberal playing 
field’.36 One expression of these possibilities is the emergence of a social neoliberalism, 
they state.37 Ó Riain criticises the competition state concept for obscuring ‘the existence 
of a political space for struggles within and through existing institutions over how 
development could and should be structured’ as it ignores ‘the many political possibilities 
that the institutions of economic development present for future transformation’.38 What 
here distinguishes proponents of each of the concepts is the potential for transformation 
that exists. For, as made clear above, competition state theorists also recognise that 
politics matters and that it results in different outcomes in different states – ‘different 
versions of neoliberalism’. Ó Riain goes further in claiming that spaces exist for going 
beyond neoliberalism to social democracy and his book ends by outlining what this might 
entail.39 Here again what is at issue is more empirical than theoretical: Cerny et al. 
outline at some length the erosion of the basis for a social democratic alternative as it is 
happening in practice in many parts of the world whereas Ó Riain’s account is limited to 
a purely theoretical outline of what such an alternative might look like while neglecting 
the political or social bases for its emergence. On the contrary, he acknowledges that the 
developmental state ‘will face an increasingly contentious politics of national inequality 
because unequal integration into the globalisation project undermines solidaristic national 
social contracts’; however, he fails to address how it might overcome these to build a 
more social democratic alternative.40 From these accounts therefore a lack of clarity 
lingers as to whether, through progressive political actions, both the competition and the 
developmental states could come increasingly to resemble one another. Indeed, Cerny has 
equated the East Asian developmental states with competition states.41 Yet, it does 
appear that a fundamental difference still distinguishes Cerny’s social neoliberalism from 
Ó Riain’s social democratic developmentalism with the latter entailing a much stronger 
version of governing or restraining the market whereas the former is posited on a benign 
market to which the state plays a supporting role.  
 
Testing hypotheses 
As outlined in the previous section, both the developmental state and a competition state 
remain hypotheses to be tested. This is one objective of this article. Accepting the 
critiques of Hay and Phillips as outlined earlier, it does so in order to take the debate from 
the ‘ethereal realms of abstraction’ 42and to devote attention to ‘variation, contingency 
and specificity in the institutional structures of states, the nature of state strategies and the 
types of state-society linkages that prevail in particular political economies’, as Phillips 
put it.43 It does this through examining the logic of policy in the Irish state, seeking to 
identify if this follows a developmental or a competitive logic. Again following from 
Phillips’s critique of economism in the literature, it chooses the area of social policy as 
this has tended to be neglected by proponents of the developmental state. This section 
outlines a methodology through which both conceptions of the state will be tested.   
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While Ó Riain acknowledges the unevenness evident in the actions of Ireland’s 
networked developmental state, its claim to be developmental rests on its transformative 
capacity. Evans, on whose concept of embedded autonomy Ó Riain bases his theory,  
places a lot of emphasis on the need for the state to be encompassing and coherent, 
reconciling conflicting interests, immersed in a dense network of ties that bind it to 
societal allies with transformational goals. Evans writes: ‘The state’s corporate coherence 
enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and helps groups that share its vision 
overcome their own collective action problems. Just as predatory states deliberately 
disorganize society, developmental states help organize it’.44 Beyond the uneven capacity 
which is a feature of all states, an encompassing logic of developmentalism is therefore 
seen to characterise those states most successful at developing the ability to adapt to fast 
changing external circumstances and challenges. This logic, then, becomes the crucial 
criterion for judging whether the Irish state is developmental. 
 
Turning to the competition state, Cerny identifies what clearly distinguishes the 
competition state when he writes that ‘liberalization, deregulation, and privatization have 
not reduced the role of state intervention overall, just shifted it from decommodifying 
bureaucracies to marketizing ones’.45 Referring to various areas of policy such as 
industrial policy, trade policy and social policy, he adds that ‘in all these settings, the 
state is no longer able to act as a decommodifying hierarchy (i.e., taking economic 
activities out of the market). It must act more and more as a collective commodifying 
agent (i.e., putting activities into the market) and even as a market actor itself.46 
Commodification therefore becomes the criterion for judging whether the Irish state is a 
competition state. 
 
A major weakness of competition state theory is that it has been developed largely in the 
abstract, with little empirical application or testing. Since the competition state prioritises 
economic competitiveness over social cohesion and welfare through subordinating the 
latter to the logic of the former, it follows that empirical examination of how Ireland’s 
social security regime has changed over the past two decades offers evidence to test the 
applicability of the competition state to Ireland. This period is chosen as it coincides with 
the transformation of the Irish economy: the turnaround in state policy that laid the 
foundations for the Celtic Tiger is usually dated to the actions of the incoming Fianna 
Fáil government of 1987. An examination of the changing nature of social security policy 
over this period will serve to test whether the Irish state is following a wider logic of 
developmental transformation, or whether this is limited to spheres such as industrial 
upgrading but not generalised as a feature of state policy.  
 
Five indicators of social security recommodification are elaborated and examined in turn 
– regulation, retrenchment, residualisation, activation/conditionality and defamilarisation. 
These indicators allow an analysis of how the role of the state has shifted over the period 
in question, whether fiscal policy has become more neo-liberal and has resulted in greater 
vulnerability and inequality, and the extent of reliance on the market to provide public 
and private goods. These indicators would also be applicable to other areas of policy like 
health, housing or education. Testing each indicator highlights where Irish social security 
policy is consistent with or deviates from movement towards a competition state. On the 
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other hand a general review of the scale and scope of policy change in each area also 
presents an opportunity to test for evidence of a transformative process of development in 
social security policy. The characteristics of each of the indicators can be described as 
follows:  
 
• Regulation: The function of the state changes. New public management 
regulatory frameworks enable governments ‘to steer but not row’.47 New forms of 
governance lead to the delegation of policy to new actors at national and other 
levels. This empowers business and professional technical elites. Privatisation of 
provision occurs either directly or by organising public service delivery around 
commercial or market consumer principles.  
• Retrenchment: The prioritisation of international competitiveness results in a 
‘low tax, low inflation’ fiscal policy as expressed and supervised in the EU’s 
Growth and Stability Pact. Fiscal pressures lead countries to resort to short-term 
cost cutting and long-term cost containment and cost avoidance.  
• Residualisation:. The focus on maintaining low welfare rates to promote work 
incentives has inegalitarian implications for those who cannot exercise 
employment routes out of poverty. Non-labour market participants including the 
elderly, people with disabilities and those involved in ‘caring’ duties at home are 
more vulnerable in the increasing relative gulf between the rich and poor.     
• Activation/conditionality: Passive income maintenance shifts to active spending 
on training and education. Welfare is reinvented into ‘workfare’ where income 
support is more conditional and linked to obligations to participate in the labour 
market. Positive encouragement coexists with punitive sanctions.  
• Defamiliarisation The quality of women’s employment will be determined by the 
degree of individualisation of social security, access to quality education and 
training and sufficient investment in appropriate and affordable childcare and/or 
family-leave arrangements. The increased labour-market participation of women  
commodifies caring functions. 
 
How each of these indicators applies to the Irish case is now reviewed in turn. If policy is 
found to conform to these indicators it will constitute proof of a competition state logic 
dominating policy whereas if these indicators are found not to apply or to apply only 
weakly, and if a more socially transformative logic is seen to guide state actions, then this 
will constitute evidence of a developmental logic governing state actions. 
 
Changing nature of Ireland’s social security policy 
Regulation 
Both concepts stress the transformation of the role of the state and changes in the nature 
of governance. Here we examine trends in regulation to identify the extent to which, in 
Ireland’s social security policy, power has shifted to international capital and business, 
services have been privatised and new public management practices have been 
introduced.  
 
A regulatory state ‘should provide a working framework of rules and performance 
indicators or targets for market actors to follow’48. Historically Ireland has been a mixed 
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economy welfare state but social security has been almost exclusively a statutory 
responsibility.  Over the past two decades the state has made some attempts to divest 
itself of social security responsibility and so follow a more regulatory path. Since 1991 
the state promoted the social inclusion role of the non-profit private sector with, first, 
local Area-Based Partnerships and, since 1994, employment support functions including 
the Local Employment Service have been delegated to local non statutory agencies.49  A 
1999 White Paper promoted regulation of the community and voluntary sector and NESC 
and NESF documents in 2005 and 2006 respectively50 signalled a shift to service 
contracts requiring a new model of governance for third-sector organisations where the 
role of the state moves away from the provision of services to ‘a regulator of rights and 
standards and enabler of local activist networks’.51 However the scale and scope of 
transformative change has not reflected the ambitious rhetoric. A further but failed 
example of the state’s attempt to divest itself of its traditional social protection role was 
when a proposal to transfer disability protection to employers was blocked by the veto 
power of employers in both 1988 and 1992. This contrasts with the British experience 
where the state was able to transfer this function to private business. Irish government is 
more vulnerable to veto players blocking policy and is less able to divest itself of, or 
transform, social protection functions. 
 
The needs and power of capital have become key drivers of social security policy. 
Employers and business work in a political advocacy coalition with two key government 
Departments (Finance, and Enterprise, Trade and Employment). The needs of 
international companies are facilitated by allowing them refocus social protection into 
private ‘packages’ of market-led social security provision that fundamentally alter how 
workers perceive the context and choices around work-related social provision. Such 
transformation is facilitated but not led by the state. International organisations are 
becoming more pivotal through processes like the EU procurement process which obliges 
tendering, to private and public bodies, of delivery services previously monopolised by 
statutory bodies (for example contracts for social security postal delivery). The state 
resists rather than promotes this transformation of policy. There is more overlap between 
domestic and international policy coalitions, particularly in the EU Open Method of Co-
ordination covering employment policy, social inclusion and pensions policy, and more 
regular policy dialogue with the OECD. In this merged public/private and 
national/international space, the emergence in Ireland of a professional technical elite can 
be identified whose members engage in coordinative discourse at one remove from the 
political realm. Changing governance means more than a simple delegation of tasks, as 
renegotiation of the relationship between the private and public spheres involves a shift in 
power. Perhaps the clearest example is the government invitation to the private pension 
industry to chair the National Pensions Board. It is no coincidence to see a private, 
business-led style of governance result in promoting the commodification or privatisation 
of pensions. Strongly advocated by the international financial services sector, the 
Pensions (Amendment) Act 2002 introduced second-tier private Pension Savings 
Retirement Accounts. This policy was chosen in spite of opposition from civil servant 
advisors (disempowered by the power shifts inherent in this new forms of governance). 
International and national private-sector pressures allied to sectors of the state drove the 
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dynamic behind these moves.  The international context was the World Bank’s promotion 
of a privatisation agenda in pension policy.  
 
Managerialism is evident in Irish social policy. Consumerism, choice and new public 
management discourse are evident in the Strategic Management Initiative and Public 
Services Management Act (1997) and initiatives like ‘customer service plans’, ‘customer 
service targets’, and ‘service delivery models’ abound. A process of ‘expenditure 
reviews’ emphasising value for money has had some impact on policy development; 
however there is considerable resistance to new public management practices and 
institutional change in the Irish public service52. The capacity of a strong centralised 
bureaucracy to resist change is reinforced by the strength of public sector trade unions to 
veto change. We can conclude that there is strong evidence of the state engaging in a new 
public management ethos of customer-focused delivery but it remains to be seen whether 
such engagement has fundamentally transformed staff and claimant experience of social 
security delivery and whether in this instance the state has the power to transform public 
service delivery. Overall, then, in terms of the changing nature of regulation, there is little 
evidence of a transformative developmental logic behind such policy change. 
 
Retrenchment 
In a competition state we would expect a low-tax development model to necessitate 
budgetary constraint and cost containment measures whereas a developmental logic 
would lead one to expect more generous state investment in the development of services 
during a period of economic boom. In the Irish context two factors are worth 
highlighting.  One factor is path dependency. Cerny’s ‘competition state’ emerges out of 
the tensions between the demands of economic globalisation and the embedded 
state/society practices that characterised the national welfare state. However the Irish 
welfare state was never as deeply embedded as older social democratic or conservative 
welfare states and never fully aspired to the general maximisation of public welfare. In a 
liberal residual welfare state with a high degree of reliance on means-tested payments, 
there is little room to reduce already ungenerous payments. The second factor is Ireland’s 
exceptional economic performance. Ireland’s high economic growth rates and limited 
pressures from an ageing population means that from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s, 
Ireland not only suffered less fiscal pressure than did other OECD countries but had 
budget surpluses and the capacity to expand social security rates and coverage. That such 
expansion did not happen is as much part of the story as what actually happened. The 
period has been described as a missed opportunity. The Irish story is one of arrested 
development where government abstained from using the fruits of economic growth to 
expand and improve social protection to the degree that might have been anticipated in a 
period of economic growth.53 In other word despite the fiscal capacity to be truly 
transformative the Irish government chose to leave the social security system largely 
intact and unchanged.  
 
It is possible to review retrenchment experience not only from the perspective of short-
term cost cutting but also longer-term cost containment and cost avoidance. Ireland 
experienced significant social insurance retrenchment in the last 20 years, but less 
retrenchment of social assistance payments. Two sets of social security cuts, the 1992 
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‘Dirty Dozen’ and the 2003 ‘Savage Sixteen’ can be characterised as short-term 
responses to periods of particularly tight fiscal austerity (the 1992 EMU preparations and 
the post 9/11 recession in 2002-03). The period cannot be characterised as one of 
significant retrenchment or budgetary transformation.54 Many cuts, such as the 1994 
child-income support reforms which froze the monetary value of means-tested child-
dependant allowances, reflect policy restructuring motivated by work incentives rather 
than fiscal pressures.55 Subsequent policy processes advising the restructuring of child 
income supports have not resulted in policy change. 
 
Less obvious long-term cost-containment policies have had a more serious impact on 
Irish society. The Department of Finance, with its concern for controlling expenditure, 
dominates the setting of social security rates. Proposals in 1998 for a pensions adequacy 
benchmark and in 2001 for an adequacy benchmark for the lowest social assistance 
payments56 were rejected by an advocacy coalition of the Department of Finance, 
employers’ representatives and the Department of Enterprise and Employment. They 
were motivated by a combination of future cost containment, maintenance of work 
incentives and ensuring a level of flexibility considered essential to adapt to the global 
economy. More puzzling in the Irish case is the failure in the early 1990s to index earned 
income disregards.57 Freezing income disregards makes work incentive policy less 
effective and is inconsistent with a productivist-focused competition state. Such deviation 
is more likely explained by a cost-fixated Department of Finance dominating annual 
budget negotiations than by any developmental logic.  
 
As well as cost containment there has been significant ‘cost avoidance’ or resistance to 
accommodate new social risks through the social security system. The failure to 
accommodate gender-related reform is discussed later. Cost avoidance can also be seen in 
policy responses to inflows of asylum seekers and migrant workers. State policy is to 
exclude these needs from Irish social security. In 1999 asylum seekers were restricted to 
‘direct provision’ welfare entitlement. The May 2004 restriction of welfare entitlement to 
‘habitual residents’ left migrants at the mercy of the market. As a result of direct lobbying 
from international companies, legislation was introduced to exempt certain non-EU 
migrant workers from social insurance coverage. Social security policy is therefore 
actively responding to the needs and desires of international capital rather than to 
international labour. Rather than social policy transforming to meet the needs implied by 
new social risks in a more global economy, the state has failed to respond to new needs or 
to transform social policy to meet global risks.    
 
Residualisation 
Competition state theory anticipates new forms of inequality, increased gaps between rich 
and poor and that those most distant from the labour market (older people, carers, women 
in the home, lone parents and people with disabilities) will suffer most poverty. A 
defining characteristic of the developmental state, by contrast, has been growing social 
equality. Here we review Irish trends towards more use of targeted means-tested 
payments, resulting in increased relative poverty and shifts in the risk of relative poverty.  
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Because ‘Ireland is exceptional within the EU for the high proportion of its social 
spending which is means tested’58 there has been less shifting from universal to selective 
social security payments than one might otherwise expect in a competition state.59 This 
path dependency is reinforced by the NESC recommendation that Ireland maintain this 
hybrid model and reliance on means-tested payments60. Despite employment growth and 
decreases in unemployment, levels of dependency on social welfare among the working 
aged have not been transformed but remain stubbornly high.61 High dependency on 
means-tested payments might not matter if payments were adequate. However, Irish 
policy has always stressed work incentives and low replacement rates. As NESC rightly 
observes, a more transformative or developmental social policy would seek to increase 
welfare generosity.62 However rates, which have always been characterised by a minimal 
subsistence type of support, have in fact further declined relative to average net 
earnings.63  
 
Inequality is expected to rise in a competition state and to fall in a developmental state. 
There is evidence of a widening of income inequality in Ireland over the course of the 
economic boom. Between 1994 and 2005, the poorest ten per cent’s share of national 
income decreased by 0.6 per cent and the richest ten per cent increased by 1.2 per cent. 
While, in 1994, 15.6 per cent lived below the 60 percent poverty line, by 2005 18.5 per 
cent lived below the same line compared to the EU average of 15 per cent.64 Other 
measures of income inequality such as the S80/20 and the Gini coefficient remained 
stable over this period at 5 and .33 respectively. As Whelan and Layte put it, the Irish 
state ‘has not prioritised equity as an objective’ and has made ‘no concerted attempt to 
equalise incomes through taxation and redistribution’.65 Such persistence (and on some 
measures worsening) of inequality is neither transformational nor developmental. Nor is 
such inequality a question of lack of capacity. Rather it confirms the political choice to 
follow the central logic of a competition state and keep welfare relatively ungenerous in 
order to preserve work incentives.  
 
There has also been a shift in the composition of groups experiencing relative poverty. 
Consistent with what would be expected under a competition state, those outside the 
labour market experience a higher risk of poverty. Unemployment, while still significant, 
is no longer the major risk factor; these at greatest risk, people with disabilities, found 
their rate increased by 24 per cent from 1994 to 2003 and these are closely followed by 
the aged and people in home duties/lone parents (respectively up 23 and 16 per cent over 
the same period). Consistent with competition state theory on the working poor, those in 
work experienced a 6 per cent increased risk of poverty in the same period.66 The trend is 
clear. Those relying primarily on social welfare, particularly those in receipt of social 
assistance means-tested payments, are most likely to fall below poverty lines linked to 
average incomes.67 There has been little transformation of their lives relative to the 
degree of change in overall incomes during the Celtic Tiger period.  
 
Activation/Conditionality  
The traditional principle of designing social security to preserve work incentives is now 
underpinned by a new Irish focus on ‘performative inclusion’, which stresses 
employment as the best route out of poverty.68 This policy direction is reinforced through 
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both employment support services and activation policies.69 This section seeks to 
establish the particular style and scale of Irish commodification by reviewing three key 
trends: spending on active measures, changes in ‘conditionality’ and extension of 
activation beyond unemployed claimants. If Irish social policy rhetoric is translated into 
policy, it is here that we might expect to find significant transformation of social policy 
towards more active policy.  
 
In the competition state we expect public investment to shift to active labour market 
spending. Significant active labour market expenditure is a long-standing feature of the 
Irish welfare state70 and Irish spending on active labour market programmes increased 
from an already comparatively high 1.46 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 1.53 percent of GDP 
in 2000 (a significant real spending increase). Active labour market programmes,  
administered by a number of government departments, have been criticised for a lack of 
focus on progression to employment.71 Boyle explains this as an outcome of strong 
advocacy coalitions, including backbench politicians, supporting the social-policy rather 
than the labour-market aspect of programmes.72 While, over time, programmes have 
become more progression oriented and linked to participation obligations, there is still 
scant evidence of the level of transformational institutional reform of either employment 
serices or income support offices experienced across most OECD countries.  
 
Irish social security literature is ambiguous about whether Irish policy moved towards 
more work obligations. McCashin, Van Oorschot, Boyle, Ó Riain and O’Connell, Daly 
and Yeates, Martin and Grubb and Pearson73 all conclude that compulsion is remarkably 
absent in the Irish policy regime relative to more conditional practice in both liberal 
regimes and small open economies. Empirical evidence supports Taylor’s and Dukelow’s 
conclusions that policy shows significant supportive and punitive changes which, 
combined, have pushed or pulled welfare claimants towards employment.74 This stronger 
style of commodification, ‘systematic engagement’, was introduced in the 1997 National 
Employment Action Plan (NEAP), a window of opportunity occasioned by the European 
Employment Strategy Open Method of Co-ordination, which required each national 
government to enter into a national policy dialogue and produce a National Employment 
Action Plan to promote activation and other policy.  
 
While increased links between national and international interests influenced and 
weakened institutional vetoes on conditionality, there remain institutional vetoes on a 
stronger model of conditionality which would transform work obligations to lone parents, 
spouses of male claimants, and people with disabilities. The Department of Social and 
Family Affairs (DSFA) argues that reluctance to extend conditionality is due to the lack 
of a coherent childcare infrastructure and of services for people with disabilities75.  
Procrastination may also be due to fear of a political backlash from those who might 
conservatively respond to measures designed to deny women their ‘right’ to work in the 
home. The patriarchal culture may not yet be comfortable with measures to promote 
women’s economic participation. A more recent proposal that all social assistance 
payments enable a ‘lifetime attachment to the labour force’ therefore reflects a significant 
shift in policy consensus.76 More recently, DSFA has proposed a practical move from a 
contingency-structured social security regime to one that identifies claimants by reference 
to their relationship with the labour market: claimants are young, old or ‘working age’77. 
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Again however, despite the rhetoric about reform, there is little evidence of political 
ambition for such reform. 
 
Defamiliarisation  
The DSFA proposals in 2006 to extend work obligations to lone parents and dependant 
spouses have potentially far reaching implications; however two years on in 2008 it is not 
clear that they will be implemented. Despite considerable policy debate there has been 
little progress towards individualising social security, and Irish social security remains a 
strong male breadwinner regime in a family-based, gender-differentiated social security 
system where women experience considerable obstacles to registering as unemployed or 
accessing labour market supports. Failure to develop a childcare infrastructure remains 
the biggest obstacle to increased employment participation for women. Reliance on 
market-led responses to childcare and limiting eldercare responses to tax incentives to 
provide private nursing homes78 is what would be expected more in a competition state 
than a developmental welfare state.  
 
While the state partially individualised personal tax credits,  failure to individualise social 
security or to introduce child and elder care supports is paradoxical in a competition state 
aiming to increase the labour force participation of mothers. A neo-liberal fixation on 
limiting state intervention is a partial explanation but policy inaction or lack of 
transformation is not just about ideology or cost avoidance. Policy paralysis is due to 
politicians’ fears of introducing reforms in the absence of policy consensus and to the 
political difficulty of mediating between those advocating conflicting policy options.79 
Policy is also limited by the strong veto power of employers who resist parental leave 
policies. The lack of policy to promote women’s economic participation is also due to a 
deeply rooted ideological ambiguity about mothers’ labour-market participation in a 
conservative, patriarchal political culture.80 Despite these obstacles women’s and 
especially mothers’ labour market participation has increased significantly in Ireland. 
However, this is not because the state sought to improve  women’s social rights and 
quality of life by encouraging and enabling labour market participation; rather until 2006 
state action was limited to investment in childcare framed in a narrow productivist policy 
which aimed to promote parental employment to meet labour market shortages. In no 
way can the state be described as transformative in relation to women’s equality in the 
labour market or elsewhere.     
 
Globalisation and models of state: evidence 
The survey of the changing nature of Irish social security policy shows that trends have 
moved in a direction consistent with the competition state indicators but also stresses how 
political agency and the role played by public and private domestic institutions and 
practices as well as national and international interest groups help influence policy 
choices.81  Particular policies were mediated through Irish political institutions, ideology 
and culture. The end result is a particular ‘Irish style’ recommodification which, while 
heavily market-oriented, is still somewhat limited in the scale and scope of reforms.  
Indeed, it is remarkable how closely the Irish state’s actions echo Cerny’s description of 
the competition state model as one in which state actors, both politicians and bureaucrats, 
react to the pressures of the global market by ‘promoting the competitive advantages of 
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particular production and service sectors in a more open and integrated world 
economy’.82 In this situation, state actions ‘are often designed to enforce global market 
rational economic and political behaviour on rigid and inflexible private sector actors as 
well as on state actors and agencies. The institutions and practices of the state itself are 
increasingly marketised or “commodified”, and the state becomes the spearhead of 
structural transformation to market norms both at home and abroad’. As a result, ‘the 
actual amount or weight of government imbrication in social life can increase … at the 
same time the power of the state to control specific activities and market outcomes 
continues to diminish’ undermining the ‘overall strategic and developmental capacity’ of 
state agencies.83 Indeed, this situation results in ‘the splintering of the state itself’ as 
‘state actors themselves, once said to be “captured” by large, well-organized domestic 
constituencies, are increasingly captured instead by transnationally-linked sectors which 
set state agencies against each other as in the desire to “level the playing field” for their 
domestic clients in the wider world’.84 Many domestically oriented interest and pressure 
groups are increasingly marginalised in the formulation of policy while transnationally 
linked groups not only gain influence but also can play state actors off against one 
another. Cerny concludes: ‘The crucial point … is that those tasks, roles and activities [of 
states] will not just be different, but will lose much of the overarching, macro-political 
character traditionally ascribed to the effective state, the good state or the just state’.85  
 
The review of the Irish case also highlights the degree to which social policy reform has 
not been characterised by any transformative developmental logic. Social policy more 
resembles a frozen landscape of policy reform. A blanket of low taxation shrouds a weak 
developmental rhetoric coming from certain state departments and policy agencies. At the 
same time, the state responds quickly to the combined power of private business allied to  
certain state departments and agencies lobbying for market-based social policy. As NESC 
and Cousins86 conclude, a more transformative social policy capable of translating 
developmental rhetoric into policy outcomes remains a considerable challenge for the 
Irish state.    
 
Evans stressed how a coherent encompassing state reconciles conflicting interests 
through a complex network of ties that bind it to societal allies with transformational 
goals. Shared vision about collective problems is a fundamental organisational strategy of 
a developmental welfare state. Cousins and Connolly87 conclude however  that the Irish 
state’s attempt to manage distributional conflict through governance processes that 
embed supposed shared transformational goals in the institutional processes of social 
partnership has actually blocked transformative social policy. They emphasise how 
embedding the anti-poverty strategy in the macroeconomic policy framework has served 
to residualise that strategy and conclude that social policy will not be tranformational 
until there has been a fundamental reworking of the economic strategy underpinning the 
Irish project.  
 
This review has illustrated how it is not developmental goals but neoliberal 
commodification that has driven Irish social policy. The state finds globalisation is 
constraining to the degree that it restricts policy options that require state funding and 
hence that might require increased taxation. The same can be said of health policy 
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(incentivising the market to build private hospitals) education policy (increased resort to 
fee-paying education, subsidised by the state) and housing policy (the shift from social 
rental to affordable market homes). The review showed that the state has not withdrawn 
but has, where politics has allowed it, facilitated market-based responses to social policy. 
It is questionable whether this can be described as a model of state-led development, 
rather it is a state acting in new collaborative relationship with global market actors but 
also seeking to appease the demands and pressures of other domestic actors. The net 
result in  a country with as many domestic vetoes as Ireland is not developmental or 
transformative but indicates the failure to develop or transform social policy to deliver the 
institutions and programmes required in an era of globalisation.  
 
The Developmental Welfare State makes the hard ‘business case’ that a more knowledge-
based and innovative economy requires significantly improved social policies. In 
particular, it argues that much greater investment in families and children, and in the 
multiple supports that empower people to sustain employment throughout their lives, will 
be needed if policy is to result in a more inclusive and equal society. This suggests that 
the transformational or developmental welfare state is not yet performing in social policy 
at the same capacity as it is in economic policy. Rather there is a need to transform from a 
‘low road’ of passive social policy to a ‘high road’ of active develomental policy. As 
Sweeny observes, this entails embracing the deep changes to Ireland's educational and 
training systems and welfare state that are needed to stem the intergenerational 
transmission of educational disadvantage, the ‘brain waste’ of child poverty, the neglect 
of people with disabilities, the underperformance of ethnic minorities, and the discarding 
of older workers.88 Despite such rhetoric this transformative developmental welfare state 
is not yet in evidence and rhetoric alone will not produce it.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has examined the changing nature of Irish social security policy in order to 
test the competing hypotheses of whether the Irish state is a developmental state or a 
competition state. It has been found that the weight of evidence confirms Ireland as a 
competition state, though one in which there are some developmental aspirations. In 
undertaking a detailed study of one policy arena, this paper has moved the study of 
characterisations of the state out of the ethereal realms of abstraction criticised by Hay 
and, following Phillips, has devoted attention to variation, contingency and specificity in 
the institutional structures of the Irish state, the nature of Irish state strategies and the 
types of state-society linkages that prevail in the contemporary Irish political economy. It 
has populated the Irish state with clearly identified actors, as sought by Hay. It is hoped 
therefore that it may open a new phase in debates about how states are adjusting to the 
pressures of today’s globalisation, focusing attention in particular on how these pressures 
are mediated by institutions, actors and political cultures to account for the varied nature 
of outcomes observed. 
 
The significance of the choice of Ireland as a case study derives from its emblematic 
status as a model of developmental success in the era of globalisation.89 This article 
raises questions not only about the limitations of this success but also about its 
institutional underpinnings. Equally important however are the questions it raises for the 
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wider international debates on developmental or competition states. Central to these is the 
potential for change that exists, as this is a topic on which the theoretical debate lacks 
clarity as was outlined above. In other words, can a competition state move in a more 
developmental direction and how might such a move happen? The proposal by some 
policy makers in the Irish case to move to a developmental welfare state at least shows an 
awareness of the developmental limitations of the existing Irish state. How this proposal 
might influence the development of Irish social policy will provide an interesting case 
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